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FINTECH: ANTIDOTE TO RENT-SEEKING?
JEREMY KIDD, J.D., PH.D.*

“Innovations in Financial Technology (fintech) have the potential to fundamentally change the financial services industry and the wider economy.” 1

I. INTRODUCTION
Fintech is a reality of our modern society, 2 and will likely become
even more so in the future. Peer-to-peer lending, 3 cybercurrencies, 4 smart
contracts, 5 algorithmic lending, 6 and more, have required adaptation by
* Associate Professor, Mercer University School of Law. Thanks to participants at the #FutureLaw
Workshop 2.0 for helpful comments and suggestions.
1. NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A FRAMEWORK FOR FINTECH 1
(2017).
2. “Taken at its broadest, FinTech is shorthand for ‘innovation in financial services,’ whether
that means new products from new startups, or the adoption of new approaches by existing players
where technology is the key enabler.” Wayne M. Kennard, IP Strategies in a Competitive Fintech
Marketplace, FINTECH L. REP., July/Aug. 2014, at 1. Of course, to be fair, there have been innovations
in financial “technology”—understood broadly—for centuries, probably starting with letters of credit,
negotiable instruments, and so on. This article will use the terms in its common parlance, denoting
application of high-tech innovations to the financial sector.
3. Sometimes known as online social lending, peer-to-peer lending allows individuals to borrow
and lend money without using a financial intermediary. For a description of the industry, including the
ways that financial intermediaries are also participating, see Amy Cortese, Loans that Avoid Banks?
Maybe Not, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2014, at BU1. Currently popular examples are prosper.com, lendingclub.com, peerform.com, and upstart.com.
4. Bitcoin is the most well-known cryptocurrency, e.g., Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 160–61 (2012), but other examples include Etherium, Ripple, and Litecoin. For a more extensive list, see Cryptocurrency Market
(Sept.
30,
2017,
9:30
PM),
Capitalizations,
COINMARKETCAP
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/views/all/ [https://perma.cc/H9MY-WTUS]. Cryptocurrencies are
defined by their virtual-only existence and lack of a central repository, limiting the ability of governments to control their use and movement. Paulo Tasca, Digital Currencies: Principles, Trends, Opportunities, and Risks 22–28 (Sept. 7, 2015) (ECUREX Research Working Paper),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2657598 [http://perma.cc/BZA7-3UNK]. Verification of ownership and
transaction history occurs through blockchain technology. Id. at 5. The blockchain innovation is a
complicated one to explain, but for a valiant attempt at simplifying, see Gerald P. Dwyer, Blockchain:
A Primer (Dec. 30, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2900450
[http://perma.cc/Q8SH-VBQF].
5. Smart contracts are contracts converted to computer code that are self-executing upon the
attainment of certain criteria. Maria Letizia Perugini & Paolo Dal Checco, Smart Contracts: A Prelimi165
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consumers and producers of financial services. Our modes of doing business will continue to be challenged and changed by these and other Fintech
innovations, 7 almost certainly expanding beyond merely “promot[ing] financial inclusion, expand[ing] access to capital for individuals and small
businesses, and more broadly reshap[ing] how society interacts with financial services.” 8 By reducing transaction costs, 9 advancing technology opens
the doors to innovations the likes of which we might not even be able to
comprehend. 10 The natural opacity of the future precludes precise predictions, but not general forecasts regarding likely trends.
This essay proposes one such forecast—the rise and expansion of
Fintech is going to make life difficult for two groups: (1) financial regulators; and (2) incumbents within the regulated industries. Regulators are
likely to see their workload increase because the rate of innovation is
speeding up, requiring them to do their job more rapidly but, ideally, without any loss of accuracy and efficacy. Many Fintech observers have argued
that technological innovation is likely to increase beyond the capacity of
regulation to keep pace. 11 If true, the task of regulation becomes even hardnary Evaluation, 10–11 (Dec. 8, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2729548
[http://perma.cc/X54A-DDMW].
6. Algorithmic lending is the use of machine learning to identify and eliminate inefficient criteria for judging creditworthiness of potential borrowers, allowing lenders to identify profitable lending
opportunities that would have been missed in the past. See Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and
Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, .
7. These innovations might be disruptive to existing institutions, e.g., Brian Wolfe & Woongsun
Yoo, Crowding Out Banks: Credit Substitution by Peer-to-Peer Lending (July 11, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3000593 [http://perma.cc/G6W4-QUVK ]
(finding that smaller community banks experience reduced borrowing as Fintech firms increase);
or they may be complementary, e.g., Calebe de Roure et al., How Does P2P Lending Fit into the Consumer
Credit
Market?
(Deutsche
Bundesbank,
Discussion
Paper
No.
30/2016,
2016),
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/144836/1/865628904.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/46JP-SUSN] (finding that loans issued by peer-to-peer lenders in Germany were riskier
than those of traditional lenders, indicating that credit expands under peer-to-peer lending). For a
more comprehensive descrip-tion of the various forms of Fintech and the ways in which they might
change the financial services landscape in the short run, see ALAN MCQUINN ET AL., INFO. TECH. &
FOR
FINTECH
2
(2016),
https://itif.org/
INNOVATION FOUND., POLICY PRINCIPLES
publications/2016/10/18/policy-principles-fintech [https://perma.cc/HNY8-GW8A].
8. NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 1.
9. “Transaction costs” is the admittedly obscure name given to the many obstacles that can stand
in the way of voluntary transactions. Jeremy Kidd, Kindergarten Coase, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 141, 144–
45 (2014) [hereinafter Kidd, Coase].
10. See Karen Elliott et al., Unruly Innovation: Distributed Ledgers, Blockchains and the Protection
of
Transaction
Rights
2
(Dec.
22,
2016)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888872 [https://perma.cc/S5LS-4WCQ] (“[T]echnologies that enable distributed electronic transmission of financial value (such as a cryptocurrency like bitcoin) are a different
type of disruptive technologies that not only provide combinatorial innovation but also change the very
rules of the market by self-writing them and thus by self-deregulating themselves.” (emphasis added)).
11. See Matthew D. Cutts & Brandon C. Romain, The Future of FinTech: A Washington Perspective, FINTECH L. REP., Nov./Dec. 2016, at NL 1 (“FinTech firms . . . pose challenges for regulators since
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er, perhaps impossible. Correspondingly, regulated incumbents will find
their business model disrupted to the extent that it involves their using regulation as a way of crowding out competition in order to protect profit margins and market share.
Outside of the board rooms of large financial entities, the second effect will likely be cheered, since increased competition and lower profit
margins mean consumers keep more of their hard-earned money. 12 The
first effect will be far more controversial, due to the concerns that unregulated markets generate in all but the most devout proponents of free markets. 13 This article will articulate a general defense of free markets but,
more importantly, will explain why the potential costs of deregulated markets would be at least partially offset by a reduction in the distortions and
costs associated with cronyism and agency capture by large financial institutions. In other words, a deregulated market might not be as bad as it first
appears if it reduces corruption and cronyism in the regulatory process.
Section II will offer a basic primer on rent-seeking, a concept from
public choice economics that describes how the well-connected and/or
well-funded seek special favors from government. Rent seeking is always
harmful to consumers and, as a result, it is usually hidden or, worse, covered with grand pronouncements about how the political favors are actually
necessary to promote some public good, such as safety, stability, avoidance
of systemic risk, and so on. 14 Section II will also provide recent examples
contained in the largest financial “reform” in our history, the Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 15

FinTech companies are not subject to some of the same capital and community reinvestment standards
applicable to traditional banks.”); Erik Vermeulen et al., Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens when
Technology is Faster than the Law? 5 (Tilburg Law & Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2016-024,
2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2834531 [https://perma.cc/H4SF-8PYR] (“[W]here innovation is quicker and the global dissemination of that technology is much faster . . . regulators can often struggle to
keep up.”).
12. In economic terms, a decrease in profit—producer surplus—corresponds to an increase in
consumer surplus, the amount of money a consumer has left to spend on other things once the transaction is completed.
13. For a defense of complete deregulation, see DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF
FREEDOM:
GUIDE
TO
A
RADICAL
CAPITALISM
(2d
ed.
1989),
http://www.daviddfriedman.com/The_Machinery_of_Freedom_.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A5W-NZHZ].
Even supporters of free markets, however, argue that regulation is a “necessary evil” in markets that
have become increasingly complex over time. E.g., Aulana Peters, The Changing Structure of the
Financial Services Industry and the Implications for International Securities Regulation, 46 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 525, 526 (1989).
14. Jeremy Kidd, Quacks or Bootleggers: Who’s Really Regulating Hedge Funds?, 75 WASH &
LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Kidd, Hedge Funds].
15. Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank] (codified in scattered
sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
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Section III will explain how Fintech has the potential to curb or even
eliminate rent-seeking in the financial industry. If regulators cannot keep
up with innovation, the alphabet-soup of regulatory agencies that are tasked
with the financial sector 16 will be unable to interfere in markets to protect
incumbents. With no one able to bestow rents, the rent seeking will disappear, greatly benefitting consumers.
Section IV addresses the inevitable and, in many ways, understandable, concerns about unregulated markets. Beyond the concerns of financial
regulators, 17 many in society will be concerned that regulation is needed to
keep unprincipled swindlers from taking advantage of consumer ignorance
and effectively ruining investor confidence in our financial markets. 18 Section IV will offer a brief defense of unregulated markets but will also argue
that the same harms are inflicted on consumers by regulated—and protected—incumbents who need not fear competition. In many ways, Fintech
reduces the need for financial intermediaries, empowering consumers to
take control of their own financial health and forcing financial companies
to compete for their money. Section IV will, therefore, argue that regardless of where the “optimal” level of regulation used to be, the rise of
Fintech has shifted the ideal state in the direction of deregulation.
Section V will then offer some conclusions.
II. SPECIAL INTERESTS GET THEIR WAY, EVEN IN THE FINANCIAL
SECTOR
When the government has the ability to hand out special favors, people will endeavor to be the ones who receive those favors, spending time
16. At the level of the federal government, there are: the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS),
which is part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, tasked with regulating federal savings associations, or “thrifts”; the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the part of the U.S. Department
of the Treasury tasked with overseeing all national banks; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), an independent agency that insures deposits and manages bank failures; the National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA), an independent agency that oversees federal credit unions and insures
savings in federal and state-chartered credit unions; the Commodities Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC), an independent agency that regulates commodity futures and options markets; the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), an independent agency that regulates securities markets; the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a private corporation that acts as a self-regulatory body,
although all firms and brokers who do business in the U.S. are required by law to be licensed and
registered by FINRA; and the United States Federal Reserve, the U.S. central bank, that is responsible
for regulating the entire monetary system to promote price stability and economic growth. Add to that
list a host of state-level regulatory bodies for banks, securities, and insurance companies.
17. Who may, after all, be motivated by a desire to continue gaining personal benefit in exchange
for bestowing favors on regulated incumbents.
18. E.g., Mark Klock, Improving the Culture of Ethical Behavior in the Financial Sector: Time to
Expressly Provide for Private Enforcement Against Aiders and Abettors of Securities Fraud, 116 PENN
ST. L. REV. 437, 441–42 (2011).
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and money in both honest and nefarious means to achieve that goal. 19 To a
public choice economist, the favors are “rents” and the process of lobbying
for those favors is “rent-seeking.” 20 When politicians of one stripe decry a
“rigged system” 21 and politicians of another stripe complain about “cronyism,” 22 they are—perhaps without realizing it—making the very same argument about rent-seeking—that government processes have been
subverted to benefit those who have managed to curry favor with the right
legislators or regulators.
Rent-seeking is harmful in two primary ways. First, it distorts markets,
creating barriers to the type of competition that benefits consumers and
society. Second, all the time and money spent seeking government favors is
wasted. 23 Whoever wins the competition for government favors will reap
monopoly profits, so the contest will have a winner, but the contest itself
uses up resources in pursuit of something that detracts from social wellbeing. The contest can yield any number of anticompetitive policies—most
often, heavy regulations that only large, incumbent corporations can afford
to comply with, but also subsidies, import restrictions, exclusive licenses,
19. “Innovations” in this sphere can come from the regulator or the regulated. For example, a
savvy business owner might recognize a way in which the government can boost profits by harming
competitors in some way. The business owner will begin trying to convince legislators, regulators, or
others with relevant authority and power to make the changes necessary to generate those higher profits.
Alternatively, an entrepreneurial regulator might imagine a rule that could benefit an individual business or an industry, if only it were implemented in a particular way. This enterprising regulator could
then shop the idea around, either in the form of a sales-pitch or as an extortionary threat. See generally
FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL
EXTORTION (1997).
20. The late economist Gordon Tullock pioneered the rent-seeking concept in the context of
regulatory agencies, see generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and
Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967), but the phrase “rent-seeking” was later coined by Anne Kreuger, see
generally Anne O. Kreuger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV.
291 (1974).
21. See The Transcript of Bernie Sanders’s Victory Speech, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/02/10/the-transcript-of-bernie-sanderssvictory-speech/ [https://perma.cc/C3V9-9LHK].
22. See Senator Mike Lee, Opportunity, Cronyism, and Conservative Reform, Remarks to the
Heritage
Foundation
(Apr.
30,
2014),
https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/speeches?ID=002a1917-732e-48b4-bd3d-f314b60a9338
[https://perma.cc/TH3D-QH6J].
23. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 229 (1989). Public choice economics began largely
with discussions of rent-seeking in the context of monopolies and trade licenses. Businesses asked
government to imposed barriers to entry, making sure that there was no competition—creating a monopoly—or to obtain one of only a few import licenses, guaranteeing the ability to charge a much
higher premium than would be feasible in a competitive market. Tullock, supra note 20, at 228–31.
Kreuger argues that rent-seeking diminishes social welfare beyond the reductions occurring anytime
free trade is impeded. Kreuger, supra note 20, at 300–01. A less direct—but no less important—result
of rent-seeking is a reduction in long-term economic growth, as innovators and entrepreneurs are diverted from efforts that will improve growth rates. Christopher Koopman et al., The Sharing Economy
and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L.
529, 536 (2015).
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and so on. What rent-seeking cannot do is add to worker productivity or
lead to new, exciting innovations. Rent-seekers compete only for the right
to wield the power of government to take from someone else and give to
the rent-seeker; 24 the process leads to nothing of value, 25 only to a wasteful
transfer of wealth. 26
What does this mean, in practical terms? As special interests engage in
rent-seeking, they will attempt to defray those costs by increasing the prices they charge for their goods or services; even the process of seeking favors will harm consumers. 27 In the financial sector, that means lower rates
of return or higher fees, and that’s only the result of the seeking. When the
rent-seeking has been completed and favors bestowed, the winners will
have greater protection from competition. As the invisible hand of market
competition is obstructed by government intervention, winners have far
less reason to care what consumers want, 28 so consumers will have less
variety and higher costs. 29
How can such a wasteful endeavor continue in a democracy, where
the electorate should rebel against special benefits and privileges for small
groups or individuals and the burdens those benefits and privileges impose
on the rest of society? 30 The answer relies on another fundamental insight
24. Tullock, supra note 20, at 230.
25. This is not to say that legislative and regulatory processes cannot improve consumer or societal welfare, but any benefits thus derived are in spite of, rather than because of, the rent-seeking activities of those who want private benefits for themselves.
26. Transfers themselves cost society nothing, but multiple parties each spend large amounts of
resources seeking to convince to make the transfer. Spending money just to convince government to
take your neighbor’s money is wasteful, and when your neighbor is doing it too, the harms are compounded.
27. Remember that rent-seekers haven’t created anything new, haven’t innovated, haven’t improved their product in any way, so the increased cost to consumers is a pure reduction in consumer
well-being.
28. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
16 (Edwin Caanan ed., Methuen & Co. 1904) (1776) (“[M]an has almost constant occasion for the help
of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely
to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage
to do for him what he requires of them. . . . It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or
the baker, that we expect our diner, but from their regard to their own interest.”).
29. For example, if government regulation limits the amount of housing that can be provided in
an area—as with height or occupancy restrictions on buildings—there will be fewer apartments or
houses to rent. Competitive pressures reduced, landlords can relax their efforts to compete on both
prices quality margins. Rents will increase and amenities will decrease, because there will be a shortage
of housing and renters will accept lower-quality apartments at higher rent as an alternative to being
homeless. In the case of financial serves, the price is typically the interest rate, so borrowers will pay a
higher interest rate and lenders will receive a lower interest rate. Likewise, consumers of financial
services will find that they have worse customer service, fewer ways to access and manage their accounts, etc.
30. It is possible to view the Occupy Wall Street movement as precisely this type of revolt. The
movement did not achieve any noticeable change in the way business is done in Washington and on
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of public choice economics: the importance of concentrated benefits and
dispersed costs. 31 The costs of rent-seeking are hidden and/or spread across
society as a whole, so most voters don’t realize the costs or, if they do
know, the burden they bear as an individual is small enough to make the
results of rent-seeking, at worst, an annoyance. 32 Similarly, the benefits of
rent-seeking are concentrated, so those seeking the rents will be willing to
expend large sums of money—possibly the entire amount of expected profits—in order to secure government favors. 33
Understanding public choice principles leads to a clash of ideas. Regulation—financial or otherwise—is often thought of as a way of correcting
market failures, 34 and is justified on that basis. 35 However, regulation can

Wall Street, although some commentators argue that it is has simply refocused its attention. E.g., Michael Levitin, The Triumph of Occupy Wall Street, ATLANTIC (June 10, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/the-triumph-of-occupy-wall-street/395408/
[https://perma.cc/KF7D-WBMW].
31. Daniel A. Lyons, Public Use, Public Choice and the Urban Growth Machine: Competing
Political Economies of Takings Law, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 265, 277 (2009). Mancur Olson discussed this phenomenon in terms of concentrated interests versus diffuse interests. See generally
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1971).
32. See generally OLSON, supra note 31.
33. Tullock, supra note 20, at 228. To see why this is so, imagine a company that expects $1
million in additional profits from a government contract that will be awarded next week. In the coming
week, the company might start out expending $100,000 to convince policy-makers to choose it for the
contract. However, it then learns that another company has expended $250,000, making company 2 the
likely winner. Company 1 realizes it can expend $300,000 and still realize a hefty profit. Company 2
responds accordingly and, through typical processes, the winning bid will be somewhere around $1
million. To stop anywhere below the full amount of expect profits would be to leave some money on
the table.
34. See Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 185–86 (2002) (describing the public interest theory of regulation). The
term “market failure” has a reasonably precise definition: some circumstance that interferes with market
mechanisms and precludes prices from adjusting to achieve efficient outcomes. See, e.g., HENRY N.
BUTLER ET AL., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 125–26 (3d ed. 2014). The term is used colloquially in far less precise fashion, often referring to any market outcome that does not match the speaker’s
normative view of what the world should look like. As it turns out, those suboptimal outcomes can be
the result of prior government action, making further government intervention unwise. E.g., Ronald
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 8 J. L. & ECON. 1, 28 (1960) (“The kind of situation which economists are prone to consider as requiring corrective governmental action is, in fact, often the result of
governmental action. Such action is not necessarily unwise. But there is a real danger that extensive
government intervention in the economic system may lead to the protection of those responsible for
harmful effects being carried too far.”). See also Kidd, Coase, supra note 9, at 149; Jeremy Kidd &
Joseph Padgett, Trucker Shortage as Government Failure, 1 LOY. U. CHI. J. REG. COMPLIANCE 7
(2016) (arguing that the U.S. trucker shortage is the result of unhelpful Department of Transportation
safety regulations).
35. Kidd & Padgett, supra note 34. Other theories of regulation criticize this approach. In the
capture theory, regulatory bodies become captive to the regulated industries, which use regulation to
cartelize the industry and reduce competition. Yandle & Buck, supra note 34, at 186. In the economic
theory of regulation, formulated by George Stigler, regulation is merely another tool by which producers maximize profits. Id. (“[A]s a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and oper-
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also be a tool by which powerful incumbents pursue private gain outside of
a market context. A counter-intuitive result of legislative and regulatory
processes is that those who bear the costs of regulation often lobby for its
implementation. 36 The earliest recorded example of this outcome is the
London weavers’ insisting that the Magna Carta require that all cloth manufactured in the realm be of uniform standards. 37 Modern examples include
biotech companies lobbying for government standards on their genespliced crops, 38 cigarette companies lobbying for regulation of their own ecigarette lines, 39 and industry lobbying for environmental regulations. 40
The most extreme example of this would be sellers of illegal products lobbying to maintain their illegal status, such as bootleggers during Prohibition. 41
Regulated entities do this not because they feel guilty about supposed
harms being inflicted on society, but because they know that new entrants
into the market will not be able to afford the additional costs. 42 By raising
barriers to entry, the regulations entrench incumbent businesses, their market power, and the resulting profits that come out of the pockets of consumers. 43 Ideally, rent-seekers would like to inhibit competition without
any cost to themselves, such as restrictions on logging in public forests
when you own adjacent forests that can be harvested. 44 If that option is not
available, however, an outcome that imposes higher costs on competitors
will be sufficient, so long as you are relatively better able to bear the costs.
ated for its benefit.” (quoting George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971))).
36. Bruce Yandle, Viewpoint: Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist, AM. ENTER. INST. (May 1, 1983), https://www.aei.org/publication/viewpoint-bootleggers-andbaptists-the-education-of-a-regulatory-economist/ [http://perma.cc/N928-2MCK]; Koopman et al.,
supra note 23, at 534 (“[P]owerful and politically well-connected incumbents have an incentive to
‘capture’ the regulatory system that is supposed to constrain them. This is because, by limiting entry or
by raising rivals’ costs, regulations can be useful to the regulated firms.”).
37. Of course, the standards implemented were those already in place in London. Id.
38. Henry I. Miller & Gregory Conko, Bootleggers and Biotechs, REGULATION, Summer 2003, at
12.
39. Jonathan H. Adler et al., Baptists, Bootleggers & Electronic Cigarettes, 33 YALE J. REG. 313,
348 (2016).
40. Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political
Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 856–74 (1999). See also A.H.
Barnett & Timothy D. Terrell, Economic Observations on Citizen-Suit Provisions of Environmental
Legislation, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 25 (2001) (quoting an officer of WMX, the nation’s largest
waste management company, as supporting stricter environmental regulation because “[s]tricter legislation is environmentally good and it also helps our business”).
41. Brenner M. Fissell, Abstract Risk and the Politics of the Criminal Law, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
657, 674 (2014).
42. Adler et al., supra note 39.
43. Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, REGULATION, Fall 1999, at 5, 6.
44. Id.
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Rent-seeking in the financial industry often has an additional characteristic, that it is carefully hidden behind a screen of seemingly virtuous
concerns over consumer protection. While not unique in this regard, 45 the
financial sector has been at the epicenter of some spectacular rent-seeking
in the past fifteen years, 46 all of which masked by moral outrage regarding
the need to regulate to protect the consumer. After the scandals at Enron
and Worldcom, populist anger led to the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act of 2002, 47 a statute filled with provisions that had little-to-no hope of
affecting any meaningful change, 48 and which pointedly ignored known
solutions for the alleged problems the Act was intended to rectify. 49
Similarly, in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007–08, public outrage led to the passage of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 50 also filled with provisions that had little chance to
reduce “systemic risk,” the stated goal of the Act. 51 Dodd–Frank imposed
sweeping regulations across the financial sector, from corporate governance to hedge funds, 52 yet appears to have done nothing to end “too big to
fail.” 53 To the contrary, it appears to have led to rising costs to consumers
of financial products, 54 a tell-tale sign of increased market power and re45. For example, when President Barrack Obama announced new fuel economy standards on
May 16, 2009, those standards were cheered by automobile executives, union leaders, and environmental groups, and Obama Press Secretary Robert Gibbs opined that the diverse coalition supporting the
changes was evidence of the virtue of the standards. Bruce Yandle, America’s New Fuel Economy
Cartel, REGULATION Fall 2009, at 6, 6–7. The diversity of the coalition, however, could also be a sign
that the rent-seekers have found themselves virtuous spokespeople to hide their activities. When the
inevitable unintended consequences appear, see Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to
John Bunyan’s Celestial City, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1517 (1998) (“The law of unintended consequences decrees that the resolution of current problems will create or reveal new ones.”), it is worth
considering that they weren’t really unintended.
46. Professor Bainbridge and others have argued that shoddy policy making in aftermath of
market turmoil enjoys a long tradition, going back as far as the late 1600s. Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Dodd–Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1782 (2011);
Larry Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77 (2003).
47. Pub. L. No. 107-204,116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.).
48. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529–43 (2005).
49. At the time Sarbanes Oxley was passed, it was known that having an audit committee member with financial expertise had a positive impact on committee performance, but Congress did not
include a mandate of that type. Id. at 1532.
50. Dodd–Frank, supra note 15.
51. See Bainbridge, supra note 46, at 1797–1815.
52. See Kidd, Hedge Funds, supra note 14.
53. See Viral V. Acharya et al., The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit
Government Guarantees 6 (May 1, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1961656
[https://perma.cc/RVW5-RTA7].
54. See Todd Zywicki, George Mason Univ. Found. Professor of Law, The Dodd–Frank Act Five
Years Later: Are We More Stable?, Testimony Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Financial Services (July 9, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2651942
[https://perma.cc/95AP-FM5L] (describing the increased cost and reduced benefits to consumers).
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duced competition. 55 Even when Congress ostensibly sets out to curb the
power of large banks, those banks manage to leverage circumstances to
their advantage. 56
Those pushing the meaningless-but-costly provisions in Sarbanes–
Oxley were called “policy entrepreneurs” by Professors Romano, 57 a
phrase adopted by Bainbridge in describing Dodd–Frank. 58 Carefully considered, that phrase aptly describes rent-seeking, the application of entrepreneurial ability in the public policy arena, rather than in the business
arena. 59 The opportunities for rent-seeking may be more pronounced in the
wake of financial crises, 60 due to politicians’ needing to do something, but
the ability to gain special favors from government will drive rent-seeking
whenever the government assumes the power to grant special favors. Power
draws rent-seeking, not the other way around, and as government has
grown increasingly powerful, the level of rent-seeking has assuredly grown
with it. Of vital importance, then, is the question of how we can curb the
influence of special interests in government, a question that will be answered in the following section.
III. HOW INNOVATION (FINTECH) CAN HELP
One extreme way to eliminate regulatory rent-seeking in the financial
sector would be to eliminate the financial regulatory apparatus. Take away
regulators’ ability to intervene in the market to bestow special favors and
market actors would have to go back to the tried and true method of earning a profit by catering to consumer demand. 61 That path is foreclosed by
55. As it turns out, Dodd–Frank managed to decimate small banks and increase the size of large,
incumbent banks. Marshall Lux & Robert Greene, The State and Fate of Community Banking 3 (Harvard Kennedy Sch., M-RCBG Associate Working Paper No. 37, 2015) (“[M]any commentators, community bankers, and regulators have also expressed fear or produced research showing that Dodd–Frank
has exacerbated the preexisting trend of banking consolidation by piling up regulatory costs on institutions that neither pose systemic risks nor have the diversified businesses to support such costs. . . . Our
findings appear to validate concerns that an increasingly complex and uncoordinated regulatory system
has created an uneven regulatory playing field that is accelerating consolidation for the wrong reasons”). Dodd–Frank also managed to hinder competition from non-traditional institutions, like hedge
funds. Kidd, Hedge Funds, supra note 14.
56. E.g., Lux & Greene, supra note 55, at 19 (describing empirical results showing small community bank’s significant losses in lending volume and market share since Dodd–Frank).
57. Romano, supra note 48, at 1568.
58. Bainbridge, supra note 46, at 1815–16.
59. See Robert E. Litan & Ian Hemmingway, Is America Encouraging the Wrong Kind of Entrepreneurship?, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 13, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/is-america-encouraging-thewrong-kind-of-entrepreneurship [http://perma.cc/498K-AEZZ].
60. Ribstein and Bainbridge refer to these laws as “bubble laws.” Bainbridge, supra note 46;
Ribstein, supra note 46.
61. SMITH, supra note 28, at 26–27.
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political reality; there is simply no appetite among the U.S. electorate, politicians, and regulators for an entirely unregulated marketplace. Some would
oppose deregulation because they believe it is necessary to protect consumers but, even if it offered no benefits to society, it would still benefit the
legislators and regulators that are the recipients of rent-seeking expenditures. Those legislators and regulators would have even weaker incentives
to pursue full deregulation.
Given the political realities, the answer to concerns over rent-seeking
and its harmful effects might, at all prior times in history, have been: “we’ll
just watch them very closely and use the democratic process to police bad
behavior.” Of course, the nature of rent-seeking, as described above, is that
the democratic process is unlikely to make any significant change. 62 All
hope is not lost, however, for the current age has one thing that could provide an antidote to rent-seeking—rapid technological innovation.
Technological innovation is nothing new, of course, and it has stymied
prognosticators ever since Thomas Malthus incorrectly predicted, in 1798,
that population would soon outstrip agricultural productivity and lead to
mass starvation. 63 Advances in agricultural technology led, of course, to
dramatic increases in productivity, so that mass starvation was not only
avoided but we find ourselves in a world where many more people face
obesity, rather than starvation, as a more pressing problem. 64
As the pace of that innovation has increased in recent years, it has also
begun to stymie regulators in their attempts to control economic activity.
One of the foundational principles of economics is that people respond to
incentives, 65 so at least some entrepreneurial innovation will be aimed at
finding a way to operate in a way not covered by existing or predicted
regulations. 66 Some consider this to be an illegitimate, unethical, or even
illegal mode of business, 67 but an entrepreneur faced with high regulatory
62. It is, after all, the nature of the democratic process—complete with concentrated benefits and
dispersed costs—that makes rent-seeking possible.
63. See generally THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (1798).
64. E.g., Understanding the American Obesity Epidemic, AM. HEART ASS’N
http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/HealthyLiving/WeightManagement/Obesity/
Understanding-theAmerican-Obesity-Epidemic_UCM_461650_Article.jsp#.WYyHTVGGMdU
[http://perma.cc/SJ8X22S5].
65. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2000).
66. While the precise form of a new rule is often not known until its final publication, preliminary
rules give all those affected some idea of what they will have to face in the future. Prudence dictates
that adaptation efforts begin prior to final publication in order to minimize the total cost of the regulations.
67. This mode of thinking appears to rest on the assumption that whatever is not expressly allowed by government is prohibited, rather than an alternative assumption that whatever is not prohibited
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costs will seek to avoid those costs in order to lower costs and improve
competitiveness. So, as regulators finalize a rule, entrepreneurs have already begun to find a way to operate outside existing regulations.
This type of avoidance-innovation can gain the innovator a short window in which to enjoy increased profits as it avoids regulatory costs and
provides something previously unavailable in the market. Even if those
profits are eventually competed away, the ability to capture them will drive
innovation across the market. At some point, however, the regulator will
step in, re-imposing regulatory oversight costs. The faster the regulator
intervenes, the lower the profits captured by the innovator and the lower the
incentives to innovate. A free regulator might wait for a period of time to
ascertain exactly how the innovation will affect consumers and society. A
captured regulator, on the other hand, will intervene much more rapidly
because the incumbent will correctly view the innovation as a threat to
market power and will push for regulatory intervention. This will require
some additional rent-seeking but it will likely be less than the amount of
profits lost if the innovation gains a foothold in the industry.
Of course, imposition of regulations rarely ends innovation, so the cycle merely begins anew, with more innovations that will have to be defended against by the incumbent, through the captured regulators. Three things
should be clear from this analysis. First, so long as regulators move faster
than innovators, an incumbent will be able to maintain control over the
industry by way of the captured regulator. Second, a strong incumbentregulator bond will significantly reduce innovation in the industry. 68 Third,
an incumbent who has captured a regulatory body must engage in rentseeking proportional to the amount of innovation in the market, giving it an
additional incentive to squash innovation.
Consider that, in a static system—without innovation—a successful
rent-seeker enjoys competitive advantages that can persist indefinitely.
Whether or not the winner has to continue paying rents depends on the
actions of other participants. If new competitors believe they have a chance
to dislodge the incumbent, they may begin lobbying regulators, which will
re-open the contest. 69 Otherwise, the incumbent has achieved an anticompetitive advantage for as long as it desires.
is allowed. As a counter-argument, it is possible to view the Constitutional prohibition on ex post facto
laws, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, as a rejection of that view.
68. Innovations that come from the incumbent will not be squashed by the captured regulator, but
greater progress would be made if innovation came from multiple sources.
69. Importantly, a regulator who enjoys the rewards of rent-seeking will want the contest to
continue indefinitely, and might engage in rent-extraction, threatening to re-open the contest unless the
incumbent continues to make some baseline payments. MCCHESNEY, supra note 19, at 122 (“The
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In a dynamic system, where innovation is ongoing, rent-seeking will
be continuous, as well. Remember that the fruits of rent-seeking are regulations that impede competitors; if those competitors find a way to do business outside of the regulatory scheme, then they have avoided the anticompetitive costs of the regulations and the incumbent’s advantage goes
away. One prominent example would be ride sharing services, like Uber
and Lyft, that have largely avoided the regulatory costs imposed on the taxi
industry. As previously noted, a captured regulator will attempt to squash
innovation with new or reformulated regulations, so the practical key to
ending rent-seeking is rapid innovation, moving fast enough that the regulator loses the capacity to intervene. 70
To see why, imagine a world where innovation has just overtaken the
speed of regulation. The incumbent sees a new innovation and pushes the
regulator to squash it. The regulator obliges but, since the regulatory process took some time, the incumbent emerges from that rent-seeking endeavor to discover two new innovations that must be squashed to maintain
market power. More rent-seeking by the incumbent squashes the second
wave of innovation but, given the longer period of time to issue two new
regulations, the incumbent emerges to discover that there are eight new
innovations. Eventually, the incumbent will realize that the appeals to the
regulator can no longer maintain market power, that upstart competitors
will forever be one or more steps ahead of the regulators and that all rentseeking expenditures are wasted resources. Accelerated innovation in this
example means that each successive wave of innovation is larger, making
the incumbent’s moment of realization come that much sooner. In other
words, the more innovation outpaces regulation, the more rapidly rentseeking will end. The resources previously expended on rent-seeking will
be diverted into market innovations by incumbents and smaller competitors, 71 resulting in lower prices and higher quality for consumers. 72
overriding lesson of the rent-extraction process is that politicians are interested in any stock of immobile capital or wealth from which they can extract a share.”).
70. It is too early to say whether Uber and Lyft have avoided regulatory intervention. In some
larger cities, regulations have been imposed that curtail the availability of ride-sharing. Consumer safety
is given as a justification, but there is little doubt that it also protects the incumbent taxi medallion
owners. It is possible that ride-sharing technology cannot innovate fast enough to escape regulation, but
that does not foreclose the possibility that future acceleration will reach that point.
71. The only way to sell your product in a competitive market is to provide it at a price and
quality that consumers want. There will always be some tradeoff between the two, with some consumers making their consumption decisions solely on the basis of price and others only on the basis of
quality, but consumers generally fall along a spectrum and experimentation on those two margins is
how businesses find out that their products are profitable.
72. Of course, Fintech innovations bestow these same benefits on their own. See Greg Buchack et
al., Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
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In the realm of Fintech, it does not appear as though innovation has
overtaken regulation, though that future is by no means impossible. The
past three decades have seen technological innovation at a rate that would
have been unthinkable prior to that time. If past acceleration continues,
innovation must eventually overtake regulation, particularly since the speed
of government is intentionally hobbled by the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. 73 What will be the response if, one day, regulators
find their efforts to be largely irrelevant, that finalization of a rule occurs
only after it is no longer a binding constraint because innovation has
changed the nature of the regulated industry during the time necessary to
implement the regulation?
If we reach that point, regulators will have lost their power to intervene in the market and we will have a market that is de facto unregulated.
Existing regulations need not be repealed through formal deregulation efforts if innovation renders them obsolete, and the transition could be quite
lumpy, as different regulations would cease to be constraining at different
times. Whether we allow the transition to occur, at all, is the subject of the
following section.
IV. WILD WEST OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: GOOD OR BAD?
A society that knows that the innovation-regulation relationship is
about to change faces an important decision. If then-current regulatory
mechanisms will soon be too slow to be effective in an innovative world,
society faces three primary paths. The first is to maintain a high level of
control over regulated industries, adopting a prohibited-unless-permitted
policy towards innovation. The second is to allow innovation but adapt the
regulatory process so that it can keep pace. The third is to accept innovaWorking Paper No. 23288, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23288 [http://perma.cc/4W7U-7HJH]
(finding some evidence that Fintech lenders are better at determining appropriate interest rates and
originate loans with greater convenience for borrowers). If innovations also reduce rent-seeking, the
resulting benefits will be in addition to those arising directly from the innovation. Some market participants—including the incumbent—could find that their business model makes them less capable of
adapting to the new competitive marketplace and they will exit the market. It is possible that a selfaware incumbent might engage in rent-seeking precisely because it knows that it cannot survive a
competitive marketplace. Consumers should cheer that result, as consumers are the primary benefits of
the lower prices and higher quality encouraged by competition.
73. The slow speed of required U.S. regulatory procedures is typically viewed as harmful, Michael Livermore, Reviving Environmental Protection: Preference-Directed Regulation and Regulatory
Ossification, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 355–56 (2007) (arguing that ossification—the –“reduces the
efficiency of regulatory regimes,” “interferes with the ability of the government to pursue its chosen
ends,” “interfer[es] with learning and regime adaptation,” is “a drag on economic efficiency” and, as a
result, “is generally disfavored”), but there are also benefits, Aaron L. Nielsen, In Defense of Formal
Rulemaking, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 260–62 (2014) [hereinafter Nielsen, Rulemaking] (describing how
lengthy procedures are better at discovering truth).
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tion as the controlling feature of previously regulated markets and allow a
de-facto unregulated market to emerge. Each option has benefits and costs
which make them appropriate for some situations but not others.
A. Prohibited Unless Permitted
The potential for market failures leads many policy makers to be wary
of an unregulated future and the harms that could be caused by innovation. 74 If markets fail in significant ways, the resulting efficiencies can
potentially lead to consumer and societal harms. 75 These concerns could
lead society to choose a path that intentionally delays any innovation for as
long as it takes for the regulatory regime to decide how to minimize costs.
An extreme form would make all innovations illegal unless they had been
specifically permitted by regulatory bodies. 76 A less extreme form would
simply withhold legal recognition from those innovations, forcing them
into the grey market 77 where enforcement of contracts and other property
74. Matthew T. Wansley, Regulation of Emerging Risks, 69 VAND. L. REV. 401, 404
(“[R]egulatory agencies should be granted a new set of powers to regulate emerging risks.”). For a more
lengthy treatment of the opposition to unregulated innovation, see generally Virginia Postrel, THE
FUTURE AND ITS ENEMIES (1998). A particular concern that arises regarding peer-to-peer lending is that
it might increase the amount of household debt to unhealthy levels. See Patrick Jenkins, US Peer-toPeer Lending Model Has Parallel with Subprime Crisis, FIN. TIMES (May 30, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/84f696ec-2436-11e6-9d4d-c11776a5124d [http://perma.cc/UXR5-MGTY].
75. See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (describing
the complete degradation of a common resource when the resource is non-excludable). But see ROBERT
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1994) (describing ways in which informal rules arise to solve
commons problems and other market imperfections). Many prominent commentators have argued that
the financial crisis of 2007–08 was the direct result of deregulation. See generally, e.g., ALAN S.
BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED (2014); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE
MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Anatomy of a
Murder: Who Killed America’s Economy?, 21 CRITICAL REV. 330, 329 (2009). But see Paul G. Mahoney, Deregulation and the Subprime Crisis, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957801 [http://perma.cc/NTN8-RZ8Y] (arguing that deregulation did not
contribute to the crisis because deregulation neither hindered regulatory bodies from adapting to changing circumstances nor substantially changed the landscape on what actions were permitted by financial
institutions).
76. One area of regulation where this approach is the rule is pharmaceutical regulation by the
Food and Drug Administration, where drugs cannot be marketed until they have been proven safe and
effective. Howard L. Dorfman et al., Presumption of Innocence: FDA’s Authority to Regulate the
Specifics of Prescription Drug Labeling and the Preemption Debate, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 585, 586–
87 (2006). That mindset occasionally flows over into regulation of food products, as well. See Stephanie Strom, Impossible Burger’s ‘Secret Sauce’ Highlights Challenges of Food Tech, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
9, 2017, at B2 (describing the FDA’s refusal to declare a genetically modified soy burger as “safe to
eat” because it “has never been consumed by humans and may be an allergen”). In either case, it is fear
of the downside risk—death—that justifies the use of this restrictive choice.
77. Black markets are those markets that arise in goods that are expressly prohibited. Grey market
goods have not been prohibited but are also not expressly recognized, putting them in a form of legal
limbo. E.g., Michael C. Barnes & Stacey L. Worthy, Applying Lessons from the Opioid Abuse Epidemic
to Protect Consumers from Gray Market Biologics, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 375,
378 (2015) (“In contrast to the black market, which deals in medications that start off as counterfeit,
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rights is less certain. 78 In either case, the point is to defer the benefits of
innovation until it is clear that the benefits outweigh the costs.
The costs of this approach should be self-evident. It deprives consumers of the benefits of innovation for an indefinite period, 79 but the strong
controls also provide a much more enticing rent-seeking opportunity. If the
government has the power to prohibit that which has not been permitted,
the winner of a rent-seeking contest will have a much stronger anticompetitive edge because competition-through-innovation will be effectively prohibited. Any incumbent will seek to make sure approval is permanently delayed—or at least delayed for as long as it takes for the
incumbent to position itself to be the primary “innovator.” 80 Not only will
consumers’ lives be less rich and rewarding because they lack the new
goods and services arising from innovation, 81 but the inevitable increase in
rent-seeking will also lead to higher prices and lower quality on all existing
goods and services. These are significant costs, and are only countered by a
possible reduction in the risk of market failure, 82 a tradeoff that hardly
seems profitable for society. 83
the gray market supplies legitimate, legally compliant goods that are made by licensed manufacturers
but are distributed by unauthorized dealers or to unauthorized purchasers.”).
78. Without legal recognition for the goods, it will never be entirely clear whether the executive
or judicial branches will enforce property rights or contractual obligations.
79. It does so on the premise, described supra, that doing so is essential to protect those consumers from greater harm. It is worth considering, however, that the fears of potential harms might be
exaggerated. For example, although the lack of regulation makes some commentators fearful of another
financial crisis, Jenkins, supra note 74, there is reason to believe that the advent of Fintech innovation
could reduce systemic risk by “diversifying lending options,” Mark Fenwick et al., Fintech and the
Financing of Entrepreneurs: From Crowdfunding to Marketplace Lending 5 (Tilburg Law & Econ.
Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2017-025, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2967891 [http://perma.cc/SZ49588R]. Those consumers might also be protected from individual errors, with automated systems being
less prone to mistakes. Id.
80. In a non-competitive market, the incumbent will have minimal incentive to innovate, in any
way, but if someone else comes up with the idea, the incumbent will find a way to make it profitable,
then ask regulators to approve the innovation, subject to restrictions that guarantee the incumbent’s
continued dominance of the industry.
81. This argument obviously denies the Galbraithian critique of capitalism—that human beings
are not made any better off due to new products and services, but are only manipulated into thinking
they are by cunning advertising. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 124–31 (4th ed.
1998). Because Galbraith’s conclusions run so completely counter to both human intuition and data
regarding improvements in the quality of life enjoyed by residents of first-world countries—improved
life expectancy through medical innovations, just to name one—that nothing is lost by abandoning such
an unserious claim.
82. See NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 8 (“[T]here are also risks associated with new
and untested technologies, as well as the use of existing technologies for new purposes. If left unmanaged, these risks could pose harm to the wider financial system.” (emphasis added)).
83. The harms arising from this path are so severe that it seems unlikely that it could be maintained in the long run. Particularly in a world with robust communication, consumers would eventually
revolt against the denial of benefits from innovation and innovations would shift to the grey and black
market, notwithstanding the disadvantages of those markets. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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Fortunately, the U.S. government appears to have rejected this approach, in the case of Fintech, at least for now. 84 The Obama Administration issued an official Fintech policy during its final days, in which it
described some of the potential benefits of financial innovation: (1) “advancing discovery, learning, and economic growth”; 85 (2) “improv[ing]
access to safe, affordable, and fair capital”; 86 (3) “bring[ing] efficiency and
transparency to financing for development projects”; 87 and “reducing
costs.” 88 While the Obama Framework does not entirely embrace Fintech
as a positive development, it does encourage agencies to take steps to
“maintain flexibility” in dealing with the financial sector. 89 Similarly, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has adopted a “Policy on No-Action
Letters,” in which it adopts a default rule of no action so long as there is
“significant uncertainty” as to whether current regulations cover the innovation. 90
B. Accelerated Regulation
The second possible path we could take is the one apparently chosen
by the Obama Framework and the CFPB No-Action policy—use the current regulatory regime. 91 There are problems with this choice if, as this
In so doing, regulators might empower the grey and black markets to grow faster than the legal market,
diminishing the impact of any regulation in the legal market.
84. One commentator has argued for a variation on the Precautionary model—where all new
innovation would be prohibited until regulations could be implemented to assure minimization of
risks—called the Experimentalist model, where regulatory agencies would prohibit immediate implementation of innovations that could “plausibly create[] a significant risk to health, safety, or the environment,” but would also begin conducting randomized experiments to generate knowledge and
understanding that would allow for regulation. Wansley, supra note 74, at 405. But see Vermeulen et
al., supra note 11, at 10 (“[S]uch experimentation poses a problem for regulators. Too often, ‘success’
for regulators is defined in negative terms as the avoidance of catastrophe. Avoiding grounds for criticism inevitably results in an overly cautious approach (the “precautionary principle”). From the perspective of entrepreneurs and consumers, such caution can be a ‘disaster’ or at least less preferable.”).
85. NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 3.
86. Id. at 4.
87. Id. at 5.
88. Id. at 6.
89. Id.
90. Policy on No-Action Letters; Information Collection, 81 Fed. Reg. 8686 (Feb. 22, 2016),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201602_cfpb_no-action-letter-policy.pdf
[http://perma.cc/WS8FU4FS]. As is always the case with a transition of power from one party to the other, it is unclear how
much of the CFPB’s policy will be maintained by the Trump Administration. The United Kingdom
Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) has adopted a related “sandbox” policy for cryptocurrencies,
where startups are allowed to experiment in a limited space, without being subjected to all UK financial
regulations. Regulatory Sandbox, U.K. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Nov. 5, 2015).
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/project-innovate-innovation-hub/regulatory-sandbox
[https://perma.cc/EGV6-H9Z8].
91. Both documents are replete with references to safety, consumer protection, stability, and even
fairness. While they reject the rigid, permission-first approach of the first path, they continue to empha-
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essay argues, the speed of regulation is falling behind the speed of innovation. If current regulatory procedures are not keeping up, then we will need
to speed up the process, 92 but it bears asking two important questions: (1)
whether the benefits of speeding up the process are worth the costs; and (2)
whether doing so is merely delaying the inevitable?
1. A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Accelerated Regulation
A prerequisite for advocating accelerated regulation is surely a belief
that regulation, generally, is necessary to protect consumers and the integrity of the financial markets. 93 It is this belief that supports the “ossification” 94 view of administrative law, or the view that existing procedural
requirements are harmful because they keep agencies from moving quickly
in the face of new risks. 95 If the primary concern is consumer protection,
then delays resulting from a requirement to “check off procedural boxes” 96
size perceived failings in financial markets and the need for great care in determining which innovations
will be helpful. It should come as no surprise that those possessing regulatory or legislative power look
first to the existing regimes to solve the problem. See Cutts & Romain, supra note 11 (describing
increasing concern about, and activity related to, Fintech in Congress and among regulators).
92. Some countries have already recognized that the speed of innovation is too much for their
regulatory regimes, and have taken steps to grant “regulatory flexibilities” in dealing with Fintech
innovation. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, IOSCO RESEARCH REPORT ON FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES
(FINTECH)
74
(2017),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7PW9-444K].
93. NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 4. See also Thomas Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks at Fintech and the Future of Finance Conference, Kellogg School of Management,
Northwestern
University
3
(Apr.
28,
2017),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/newsissuances/speeches/2017/pub-speech-2017-48.pdf [http://perma.cc/E2RW-24DD] (“Innovation can
change everything, but it must fit within the company’s business plan, the risks must be understood and
managed, and consumers must be treated fairly. That’s what I mean by responsible innovation and
that’s what innovation must achieve for it to live up to its potential.”). To many observers, “regulation
is necessary” and even “in the interests of fintech firms” in order to foster trust. Patrick T. Harker,
President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Remarks at the Global Interdependence
Center’s Payment Systems in the Internet Age Conference 4 (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/publications/speeches/harker/2017/02-06-17-gic-paymentsystems-in-the-internet-age.pdf?la=en [http://perma.cc/8RPF-RGQV]. Of course, if true, there would be
no need for accelerated regulation for the industry would never be successful until regulated, for who
could trust an unregulated industry? McGinnis and Roche argue that digital currencies, at least, rely not
on trust in government regulation but, instead, on computer logic. John O. McGinnis & Kyle Roche,
Bitcoin: Order Without Law in the Digital Age 4 (Nw. Univ. Pritzker Sch. Of Law, Pub. Law Research
Paper No. 17-06, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2929133 [http://perma.cc/EH5J-YY87].
94. See Charles W. Tyler & E. Donald Elliott, Administrative Severability Clauses, 124 YALE L.J.
2286, 2328 n.162 (2015) (collecting ossification literature).
95. Wansley, supra note 74, at 409 (“[N]otice and comment requirements are crippling when
agencies seek to regulate emerging risks.”); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory
Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1342, 1354 (2013) (warning of the dangers
of “underregulation”).
96. Aaron Nielsen, Sticky Regulations, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2950732 [https://perma.cc/CX9Q-TSBJ] [hereinafter Nielsen, Regulations].
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would certainly be frustrating. Those procedural boxes, however, are designed to improve the quality of agency decisions and to protect the due
process rights of the regulated parties. 97 Even many who argue for accelerated regulation concede that procedural requirements can have the positive
effect of encouraging “the rationality of agency policymaking.” 98
A slower regulatory process, therefore, allows for greater deliberation
and, ideally, better decisions. It also allows those who are the subjects of
regulation an opportunity to have their voices heard and their perspectives
considered before they are adversely impacted. These process and accuracy
benefits must be balanced against the potential harms that proponents of the
ossification view believe are inflicted on society because new regulation is
delayed while procedural boxes are checked. 99 Society must choose among
the various speeds that can be established for regulatory processes; the
slower speed of the APA was chosen decades ago, and society has the right
to change its mind as the world changes. In deciding how fast regulation
should move, however, society should include considerations of rentseeking, whether accelerating the speed of regulation would increase or
decrease the power of special interests in the regulatory process. Will accelerating regulation increase the power of incumbents and further reduce
consumer welfare through restrictions on competition?
The first thing to consider in answering that question is the type of
changes that would need to be made in order to speed up regulation. Some
improvements will be possible through the application of technology to
regulatory compliance, or “RegTech.” 100 Other changes, however, will
require relaxation of existing procedural protections, including lightening
of notice and comment requirements, 101 abandonment of review by the
White House’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 102 and loos-

97. Id. at 2. At least one prominent scholar rejects administrative power as unconstitutional
because, by its very nature, it subverts Constitutional protections. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE THREAT (2017).
98. Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1144
(2009).
99. For an example of this type of reasoned balancing, see Nielsen, Regulations, supra note 96
(describing both the costs and benefits to slow processes).
100. Douglas W. Arner et al., The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?, 47 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 1271, 1315–18 (2016).
101. See, e.g., MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32240, THE FEDERAL RULEMAKING
PROCESS: AN OVERVIEW (2013).
102. E.g., Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma,
61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1794 (2012).
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ening of the “hard look” standard imposed by the courts when reviewing
agency decisions 103—if not eliminating ex post judicial review, altogether.
The form of regulation might also change. Formal rulemaking has
been largely abandoned because it is too slow, 104 but we might also see the
abandonment of even informal rulemaking, adjudication, and the entire
stable of current regulatory options. Regulators have already begun to experiment with new ways of achieving their goals, including regulation-bylitigation and regulation-by-negotiation. 105 More recently, regulators have
experimented with regulation-by-Dear-Colleague-Letter, 106 where instructions were disseminated to regulated entities without the force of law but
with the threat of liability if the instructions were not followed. Similarly,
some regulatory goals have been pursued by pressuring financial intermediaries to cut off banking services to entities that were not in compliance
with the regulatory goals. 107
How would these and other potential changes affect the incentives of
rent-seekers? As a preliminary matter, any acceleration in the speed of
regulation would counter the negative impact innovation has on rentseeking. Rapid innovation makes regulation less effective, reducing the
incentives to compete for rents; increasing the speed of regulation dilutes
that impact because regulators are better able to keep pace. In terms of the

103. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 526–27
(1985).
104. Nielsen, Regulations, supra note 73, at 242–53.
105. Andrew P. Morriss et al., Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 180–83
(2005).
106. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON TITLE IX ENFORCEMENT (2011),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZVZ6HGCV].
107. See Michael J. Bresnickat, Exec. Dir., Fin. Fraud Enf’t Task Force, Speech at the Exchequer
Club of Washington, D.C. (Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/financial-fraudenforcement-task-force-executive-director-michael-j-bresnick-exchequer
[https://perma.cc/K7W5ETX4] (describing government efforts to foreclose access to financial institutions and payment processors “because they are the so-called bottlenecks, or choke-points, in the fraud committed by so many
merchants”). Known originally as Operation Choke Point, it is defended with the same rationale as
traditional regulation—consumer protection. Jeri Leigh McDowell, Insidious Design or Instrument of
Progress: The Multi-Agency Initiative to Choke off Undesirable Businesses’ Access to the Financial
World, 47 TEX. TECH L. REV. 803, 807, 811–12 (2015) (“Operation Choke Point has led to an alarming
number of account terminations ‘based solely on politicized regulatory pressure and informal intimidation related to the products and services being offered by legal, licensed and regulated businesses.’”);
see STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 113TH CONG., THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE’S “OPERATION CHOKEPOINT”: ILLEGALLY CHOKING OFF LEGITIMATE BUSINESS? 2 (2014);
Todd Zywicki, The Dodd–Frank Act Five Years Later: Are We Freer? 8–9 (George Mason Univ. Law
& Econ. Research Paper Series, No. 15-54, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2704076
[https://perma.cc/MC76-2ZYK].
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power of regulators, then, increasing regulatory speed increases power 108
and should increase rent-seeking.
Accelerated regulation could also change the mode of rent-seeking. If
regulators are making their decisions more rapidly, any attempt to tailor
those decisions for private benefit would need to speed up, as well. Rentseekers would begin to abandon any semblance of nuanced, subtle persuasion and would compete for rents more openly, in order to gain the attention and favor of regulators. As it becomes more difficult to conceal rentseeking, the public will recognize more rent-seeking and resentment could
grow. In the medium- to long-run, this would force both rent-seekers and
regulators to be more cautious. The attention could force some rent-seekers
out of the competition entirely, but notice that lower competition further
empowers the incumbents who have already ingratiated themselves with
the regulators. Those incumbents have already “captured” 109 decisionmakers at the regulatory agency; lowering the level of competition makes it
harder for any shift away from the incumbent to occur.
There is a possible scenario in which accelerated regulation could reduce rent-seeking. A more rapid regulatory process might prove impossible
to control, at least in its current form, with many regulatory bodies holding
overlapping authority. The procedural requirements that must be abandoned to achieve accelerated regulation are useful in avoiding contradictory
regulation; with those safeguards gone, a rapid regulation regime might be
unmanageable. In that case, it might be necessary to implement a much
more simplified and uniform set of regulatory requirements. 110 If that outcome were achieved, it would increase efficiency and could reduce regulatory discretion. 111 Lower discretion would mean less power 112 and,
therefore, less rent-seeking. Similarly, such simplification could also marginally increase the transparency of the regulatory system, which should
108. It does this by increasing the discretion of the regulator. If procedural requirements are abandoned, the regulator will have the ability to act quickly to respond to perceived threats. Granting the
regulator greater discretion to identify threats and act to counter them is primarily how accelerated
regulation is achieved, but that discretion means greater power in a smaller number of hands.
109. Stigler, supra note 35 (“[R]egulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated
for its benefit.”).
110. MCQUINN ET AL., supra note 7, at 32.
111. At the extreme, it is possible to imagine regulatory decisions being made by complex, machine learning algorithms, so that individual regulatory decisions are a function of pre-determined
criteria, not the discretion of a human regulator. Even that outcome would have its costs, see MICHAEL
C. MUNGER, THE THING ITSELF: ESSAYS ON ACADEMICS AND THE STATE 25–26 (2015), but a reduction
in discretionary power would diminish the incentives to rent-seek.
112. E.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 97, at 15–17 (arguing that greater discretion to regulatory
agencies increases their power by giving them authority to “impos[e] legal obligation through acts other
than those of the legislature and the courts”).
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also cause some rent-seekers to decline to compete. However, lowering the
number of loci for rent-seeking expenditures might also facilitate coordination between rent-seekers, allowing more rent-seekers to be successful. 113
Regardless of which of these forces dominate, the rent-seeking hypothesis argues that both the regulators and those regulated participate
jointly in the competition, and that both sides benefit. As a result, it is unlikely that they would voluntarily agree to an accelerated structure that
removed the opportunity to seek special favors, not to mention the ability
of regulators to profit from doling out those benefits. To the extent that the
rent-seeking story presented supra is correct, it is highly unlikely that such
a streamlined, efficient, reduced-rent-seeking outcome would be achieved
spontaneously. Instead, it would need to be imposed by Congress. Unfortunately, rent-seeking occurs just as frequently in the legislative setting, 114 so
this best-case scenario is extremely unlikely.
Accelerated regulation does little to reduce the incentives to rent-seek.
Instead, it appears to increase the power of regulators—which would increase rent-seeking—and enhances the dominance of incumbent firms,
further harming the goal of having competitive markets. There is nothing
surprising in this result; regulatory power draws rent-seeking, and there is
little reason to suspect that increasing the speed at which regulatory decisions are made would change that foundational fact of regulation.
2. Is Accelerated Regulation Just Delaying the Invevitable?
One final question deserves to be asked with regard to accelerated
regulation: whether accelerating the pace of regulation can ever be an effective long-run solution, even under ideal circumstances. Short of turning
over regulation to machines, 115 is there any way to realistically match the

113. The process would be akin to legislative logrolling, wherein legislators trade votes in favor of
each other’s pet projects. Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U.
PITT. L. REV. 803, 808–09 (2006). Log rolling almost certainly leads to greater successful rent-seeking.
In the rent-seeking scenario, the rent-seekers themselves could coordinate, with powerful incumbents in
different industries combining forces to increase the pressure for benefits to be granted to all members
of the coalition.
114. Jason S. Oh, The Social Cost of Tax Expenditure Reform, 66 TAX L. REV. 63, 98 (2012)
(“When drafting legislation, Congress is not immune to the pressures of rent-seeking—law making is a
cooperative process between Congress and lobbyists.”).
115. A lesser form of this—RegTech—is already occurring, Arner, et al., supra note 100, and
more advanced forms should be feasible in the future. Turning over compliance to machines might have
the advantage of reducing the cost of compliance, id., but more interesting is the question of whether
machine learning could be used to determine the content of regulations. Were society to choose that
path, of course, rent-seeking could still occur, but it would occur at a different point, in designing the
machine algorithms that would determine what interests to weigh most heavily. All rent-seeking activity would be directed at that single point.
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speed of innovation in a world where machine learning is an everyday reality? Once innovative forces have been released into a regulated industry,
there is no way to know where it will end, but machine learning has the
potential to increase the speed of innovation beyond what human intellect
can achieve. 116 It is therefore possible that the accelerated-regulation path is
illusory, that any potential societal gains will be short-lived, as innovation
continues to accelerate in a way that regulation simply cannot. If so, then
society will eventually face a choice between a rigid, permission-first regime and de facto deregulation, as described below.
C. De-Facto Deregulation
Whether or not we approve, our society may be heading towards a
world in which financial services are able to avoid substantive regulation
through continuous innovation. Government has the tools to slow or stop
that innovation, but only by imposing significant costs on consumers, markets, and society. It may also be that the speed and power of innovation are
stronger than regulatory power, so that government would retain only the
pretense of power. There is hope that government agents would fairly balance the costs and benefits of the available regulatory paths and abandon
futile paths, but the realities of rent-seeking make that hope a dim one.
What, then, do we do in the face of a future that many will find distressing? The right answer may be “nothing.” This section proposes to offer
both reassurance and consolation to those who find that answer distressing.
Reassurance, in that an unregulated market may not be as horrible as imagined. Even the phrase “unregulated” isn’t entirely accurate, since reputational factors continue to constrain market participants, even in the absence
of government regulation, and private ex-post regulation—tort law, for
example—would still remain and could be modified to adapt to a world
without government regulation. Consolation, in that any costs arising from
de-facto deregulation might be countered by a reduction in the ability of
established financial firms to rig the system in their favor. 117
1. Don’t Fear Markets
Fear of unregulated markets is quite common in all sectors of society,
but it may be the result of long-standing misunderstandings of what mar116. For a description of some of the ways machine learning algorithms can learn and, potentially,
outpace human thought, see Bruckner, supra note 6; and Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69
ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 84–88 (2017).
117. Neither will fully assuage the concerns of those who distrust markets.
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kets are and do, as well as a romanticization of government interventions.
Most importantly, generations of economists have—intentionally or not—
convinced millions of undergraduate students to think of “markets” as
some sort of quasi-tangible thing that strives to achieve things like “economic efficiency.” 118 The obscure way in which economists describe markets makes it much easier to vilify markets as secretive, easily-corrupted
organizations that look out only for the well-connected. 119
Consider how perspectives might change under an alternative description of markets as the aggregation of billions—possibly trillions—of voluntary interactions every day. 120 No formal structure, no organization, just
everyone on earth making daily decisions in search of a better life, and
success requires selling something people want in a way that allows potential buyers to trust you. These markets are far too complicated—billions or
trillions of moving parts—to manipulate for the benefit of small groups.
Similarly, there is no secrecy in markets, just diffusion of useful information across so many people that no one can know even a small fraction
of the total. 121 None of this is to say that markets are perfect—far from
it 122—but, in a free market, the overwhelming complexity of the system
means that any imperfections cannot be the result of conscious efforts to
manipulate. Those without an understanding of the nature of markets will
try their hands at manipulation, inevitably without success.
If a market does not provide the optimal outcome, 123 it may be that
some natural obstacle has arisen and government can prove useful in removing that obstacle. However, it may instead be that the problem is not of
118. While many economic analyses use efficiency as a criterion, it is often difficult to understand
precisely what the term means, except in very general terms. For a helpful explanation of what the term
often means and why it is helpful in the context of discussions regarding markets, see Kidd, Coase,
supra note 9, at 145–46.
119. Lee Goldman, The Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws as Applied to Employers’ Labor
Market Restraints in Sports and Non-Sports Markets, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 617, 623 (relating that the
Sherman Act was intended to protect individuals “from the evils of accumulated corporate wealth and
power in all markets”).
120. JAMES BUCHANNAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN, in 7
COLLECTED
WORKS
OF
JAMES
M.
BUCHANAN
¶
7.2.4
(1999),
THE
http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv7c2.html [https://perma.cc/KF8D-WP2L].
121. See generally LEONARD READ, I, PENCIL (1958). For a more in-depth treatment of the question, see FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC
ORDER 77–91 (1980).
122. Common sources of market imperfections are spillover effects (positive and negative externalities), non-excludability alone (the commons problem) or paired with non-rivalry (under-provision of
public goods), and barriers to entry (monopoly power). See generally Koopman et al., supra note 23 at
532.
123. It is tempting to think of “optimal” in terms of “outcomes I personally prefer.” However, it is
not always the case that a distasteful outcome is evidence that markets have failed. Humility requires
that we accept that some outcomes might be better, as a general matter, even if we disagree.
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natural origin, but was created by government. An underappreciated contribution of Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase was the important reminder that
market “failures” are often the logical-but-unforeseen results of a prior
government action. 124 If so, further government actions may be just as likely—or more likely—to generate additional problems instead of solving
existing ones. Indeed, to the extent that prior rent-seeking is the culprit,
further government endeavors on the relevant question may further entrench the incumbent’s interests to the detriment of consumers. 125
If, instead, government adopts a largely non-interventionist stance, 126
individual transactions will only occur when both parties believe that they
will be better off in the aftermath. 127 In the absence of fraud, coercion, or
other cases where the transaction is not really voluntary, a free market will
make all parties better off, but what of those cases where the parties have
bad information? In many cases, the lack of good information makes it
harder 128 to justify an argument in favor of perfectly free markets. As
Coase made clear, when transaction costs 129 are high, there may be a role
for government to play in establishing correct rules. 130
The difficulty of deriving correct, useful information can be a barrier
to voluntary transactions, but one of the primary aims of Fintech is reduction in transaction costs. 131 If potential customers think they that they are
124. Coase, supra note 34. See also Kidd, Coase, supra note 9, at 150–51. For example, occupational licensing requirements can result in a shortage of professionals in some occupation, but the
shortage is the result of the government policies, not the inability of the market to adapt perfectly to the
policy.
125. Id. at 152–53.
126. Except for cases of fraud, coercion, and the like, where government enables parties to seek
redress or invalidate contracts.
127. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15 (6th ed. 2003).
128. Though not impossible. While perfect information is often cited as a necessary condition of
well-functioning markets, e.g., Alexis Brown Stokes, An Apple a Day Keeps Shareholder Suits at Bay:
An Examination of a Corporate Officer’s Legal Duty to Disclose Health Problems to Shareholders, 17
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 303, 315 (2011) (“Market efficiency only occurs when participants have
access to perfect information.”), no individual can possibly have perfect information, see generally
Read, supra note 121, yet most markets function well even though each individual has only a small
amount of information. HAYEK, supra note 121.
129. For an explanation of the term “transactions costs,” see Kidd, Coase, supra note 9.
130. Coase, supra note 34, at 18.
131. Financial intermediaries exist to minimize a number of transactions costs, notably the cost of
connecting those with excess funds and those who need additional funds, but also moral hazard and
adverse selection, including the uncertainty regarding credit-worthiness of the borrower. Craig R.
Everett, Group Membership Relationship Banking and Loan Default Risk: The Case of Online Social
Lending, 7 BANKING & FIN. REV. 15, 22–25 (2015). Once a loan has been made and the borrower
begins to pay, the lender develops better information about the borrower’s actual risk of default; rather
than sharing that information with the market, the lender keeps it so that the borrower cannot pursue
lower interest rates from other lenders—a phenomenon known as the “holdout problem.” Id. at 15.
Peer-to-peer lending, a Fintech innovation, provides many more lenders—including microlenders not
previously present in the market—with knowledge of borrowers’ preferences and needs. By reducing
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likely to be victims of financial fraud, or if they think that it is impossible
to obtain good information, they will avoid financial markets, 132 reducing
individual well-being and long-term growth. This is a potential market
flaw, but that also means that it is an untapped profit opportunity, because
each transaction avoided for this reason is a transaction that could have
benefitted both parties. 133 A third party who establishes a reputation for
providing useful information could take a percentage of the benefits derived from new transactions.
In the Internet age, information has never been more available, and information technology innovations will make the task of information verification easier and cheaper, 134 reducing transaction costs and making
regulation in this area largely superfluous. Indeed, it is worth considering
that private entities have better incentives than government to get information correct. A private firm that fails to provide accurate information
will go out of business in a free market no one will voluntarily contract
with it when more reliable options are available. 135 Conversely, government regulators rarely face adverse consequences when things go badly,136
even when the poor outcomes are the result of the regulators’ intervening to
the finding costs, peer-to-peer lending should drive down the interest rate paid by the borrower and
raise the interest rate received by the actual owners of funds. Id. at 18; see Adair Morse, Peer-to-Peer
Crowdfunding: Information and the Potential for Disruption in Consumer Lending, 7 ANN. REV. FIN.
ECON. 463 (2015). Peer-to-peer lending also reduces default rates, indicating a reduction in adverse
selection and/or moral hazard. Everett, supra, at 51. Importantly, however, peer-to-peer lending has
apparently not yet solved the holdout problem, id. at 51–52, but an innovator who can do so will attract
far more borrowers and earn a hefty profit by reducing that transaction cost.
132. This is a variation of the “lemons” problem, identified by economist George Akerlof in The
Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). The
insight eventually garnered Akerlof a Nobel Prize. See Don Carmichael, Competition and Adverse
Selection in An Online Lending Market (June 6, 2017) (unpublished manuscript)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2985908 [https://perma.cc/A2N2-N5C5].
133. Bad information, or bad computational use of that information, can also lead to lending that
ends in default, which is also a missed opportunity for profit. Fintech innovations have improved default rates from those achieved with only credit scores, but there is still room for improvement. Atay
Kizilaslan & Aziz Lookman, Can Economically Intuitive Factors Improve Ability of Proprietary Algorithms to Predict Defaults of Peer-to-Peer Loans? (July 21, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (finding
that characteristics of the borrower and macroeconomic indicators can add accuracy to default predictions). https://ssrn.com/abstract=2987613 [https://perma.cc/AMT2-47GG ].
134. Koopman et al., supra note 23, at 540–41 (“[T]he Internet largely solves this problem by
providing consumers with robust search and monitoring tools to find more and better choices. These
tools lower both search costs and transaction costs associated with commercial interactions.”). Even the
dangers of information overload can be resolved through effective filters.
135. Id. at 541–42.
136. See David S. Hilzenrath, Eight SEC Employees Disciplined Over Failures in Madoff Fraud
POST (Nov.
11,
2011),
Case;
None
Are Fired, WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/seven-sec-employees-disciplined-on-failure-tostop-madoff-fraud/2011/11/10/gIQA3kYYCN_story.html?utm_term=.013764e06656
[https://perma.cc/4H27-5E5P]. It is unclear whether anyone at the SEC was fired as a result of the
failures leading up to the financial crisis.
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protect favored rent-seeking firms. 137 A de-facto deregulated financial market could make financial transaction not only cheaper but safer, as well.
2. A Word of Comfort to the Unconvinced
For those who struggle to accept such an admittedly-optimistic view
of free markets, 138 it is worth considering that there may be no way to avoid
an unregulated financial sector short of imposing strict—and costly—
restrictions on innovation. If so, then it can be a source of comfort that, at
the very least, the future of finance is one in which powerful players no
longer have the option of asking government for special favors. There are
certain to be some problems that arise in a market without effective regulation, 139 but that will no longer include corruption and cronyism.
Large players in the industry, to the extent they are capable of adequately serving customers without the backing of government regulators,
will survive. Hopefully, they will do more than survive, but put their resources to much better use than seeking anti-competitive favors from government, adding to the flow of useful innovations. Any company that
cannot succeed except by harming competitors and consumers through
collusion with government can and should fail, making room for new participants who can compete in the new, faster paced financial markets of the
future.
V. CONCLUSION
Fintech is coming, and its approach is a source of concern for many.
For regulators and incumbents, those concerns are valid, because innovation requires additional regulation and a corresponding increase in the
amount of rent-seeking expenditures that the incumbent must make. If the
most optimistic estimates are correct, the coming waves of innovation will
137. See Kidd & Padgett, supra note 34 (arguing that current trucking shortages are the result of
government regulations motivated, in part, by a desire to serve the interests of railroads, the primary
competitors of the trucking industry).
138. To be clear, while it is an optimistic view, it is not a utopian view of markets. After all,
markets function not because individuals care for each other, but because it is in their self-interest to
cater to the needs of others. SMITH, supra note 28, at 16. But see ADAM SMITH, THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS 166 (Prometheus Books 2000) (1759) (“Man naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to
be lovely; or to be that thing which is the natural and proper object of love. . . . He desires not only
praise but praise-worthiness; or to be that thing which, though it should be praised by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of praise.”).
139. Markets are never perfect, after all, even if they outperform government regulation. Arnold
Kling & Nick Schultz, Opinion, Markets Fail. That’s Why We Need Markets., CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Dec. 28, 2009), https://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/1228/Markets-fail.That-s-why-we-need-markets [https://perma.cc/46LK-92RX].
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do more than just inconvenience regulators and incumbents, but could wipe
away the complex structure of rent-seeking benefits that have been built up
over time. If innovation begins to outpace regulation, incumbents will no
longer be able to use government’s monopoly on force to extract extra revenues from consumers. Regulators will no longer have the power and discretion to force small competitors with great ideas be forced to comply
with unreasonable regulatory demands that are designed to delay innovation for the benefit of the large incumbents.
More than anything, these potential changes would dramatically impact consumers. By reducing the ability of incumbents to stack the deck in
their favor, rapid innovation would raise consumer welfare through cheaper
and safer financial products. Legitimate concerns exist regarding the ability
of market players to engage in fraud in an unregulated market, but those
concerns must be balanced against the reality that attempts to curb fraud
and abuse will be used by incumbents to impede competition and harm the
very consumers the regulators seek to protect. Innovations should be welcomed, especially when they take the form of market enhancements that
reduce transaction costs and destroy the ability of powerful interests to
rent-seek their way to wealth at the expense of consumers.

